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fL. A. No. 20897. In Bank. Yay 2, 1950.1

A. G. (a Corporation), Appellant,
SEYMOUR NEBENZAL et al., Respondents.

Y.

[1] Oontracts-Interpretation-Function of Oourts.-An appellate
court will adhere to the interpretation placed by the court on
, the writings and conduct of the parties with respect to the
uhlbition of a French motion picture, where such interpretation is supported by the evidence.
Literary Property-Contracts.-Where a corporation sold to
defendant its English remake rights in a French motion picture
based on a novel, reserving the right to exploit the original
-French version in such language, and also granted defendant
. - option to purchase the corporation's French rights iIi the
. original material. defendant performed his contractual obliga.tions to the corporation by paying it the designated SUlD for
the remake rights, and he was as free as any other would-be
.i.purchaser to negotiate with the person who had acquired the
.lieenie or "extension" of the French rights beyond the period
'~., was required to exercise the option.
.
of Corporate Entity.-PlaintUr waaprejudiced by a finding that defendant corporation wu
the al'". ego of defendant stockholder wliere the court's
'_.-,-,--~ that plaintifr had failed ~o establish fraud or injustice
of the stockholder was supported by the evidence.
Disregarding the corporate existenee, notes, 1 A.L.B. 610;
,.. ___. 597. See, also, 6A OaLJur. 75; 13 Am.Jur. 160.
. Die. References: [1] Contracts, 1161; [2,4, 6] Literar,y
iiWIi.m.t!. [3] Corporations, 15.
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[4] Litera17 Property-Appeal-Harmless Error.-A finding that
defendant stockholder assigned to defendant corporation cer·
tain rights in a French motion picture based on a novel which
he had purchased from plaintift', and that the corporation
reassigned such rights to the stockholder, was not prejudicial
to plaintift' in view of the tlnding against fraud and injustice
Oil the stockholder's part.
[6] Id.-Findings and Judgment.-Where plaintift' corporatioll
alleged in its complaint to restrain interference with exhibition
of its motion picture that it was the "owner of the worldwide" rights to a French motion picture based on a novel, and
defendants denied the allegation, the court correctly defined
those rights according to the findings by including in the judgment a statement that ever since a named date the corporation
did not have the right to distribute, exploit or exhibit the
picture anywhere in the world.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa
Angeles County. Clarence L. Kincaid, JUdge. Judgment
affirmed.
Action for injunctive relief and for damages. Judgment for
defendants affirmed.
Herzbrun & Chantry and David Mellinkoft for Appellant.
Fred Horowitz for Respondents.

SCHAUER, J.-In 1946 defendants began suit in a French
court to prevent plaintiff from further exhibiting the French
language motion picture "Mayerling/' Plaintiff thereupon
instituted this suit for an injunction against interference with
exhibItion of the picture and against prosecution of the French
suit, and for damages; and from an adverse judgment has
taken this appeal. We have concluded that the decision of the
trial court (sitting without a jury) that plaintiff's right to
exhibit the picture expired in October, 1945, and that plainti1f
is entitled to no recovery in this suit, must be upheld.
Resolution of the controversy turns upon the interpretation,
with the aid of parol evidence, of two written contracts entered
into between the parties hereto in 1944. In the discussion
which follows the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable
to defendants (respondents). as is required on appeal.
Plaintiff is a corporation formed under the laws of Switzerland. Defendants are Seymour Nebenzal and Nero Fi1ms~
Inc., a California corporation of which Nebenzal is a atock·
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[35 C.2d 287: 217 P.2d 6501

holder, a director, and the president; unless otherwise indicated, however, the designation "defendant" will hereinafter
refer to Nebenzal only. Also, unless otherwise stated" Mayerling" will refer to the French language picture involved in
this litigation.
" Nebenzal has been in the motion picture business in Ger, many, France and the United States for some 25 years. In
'1935 he produced Mayerling in France for the Concordia
'~'Company, the stock of which was owned by Nebenzal, Emile
: Natan, and Chiel Weissman. The picture in the French lan:(; goage stars Charles Boyer and Danielle Darrieux, and is
'''the story of Crown Prince Rudolph of Austria who in 1889
~'eomlID.i,tte,d suicide." It is based approximately 95 per cent
historical matter in the publie domain and upon "certain
~',~eatur~~ original to the script expressly written for the pic" and 5 per cent upon original material (hereinafter
~;tAmJled the" Anet material") taken from a novel also entitled
authored by the late Claude Anet. The Anet
,t ..... t,I>?1,.l was used pursuant to a five-year license (hereinafter
,"liIIn-U£CU the "Anet rights"), due to expire in October, 1940,
from the author or his heirs. The picture was
~:reileased in 1935 or 1936.
'f'}" ....,.Df'f" .. Nebenzal disposed of his interest in the Concordia
tj,(>D1]~8Ilry" the company was liquidated, and plaintiff became
of Mayerling. In 1940 Natan secured an extension
Anet rights for a five-year period expiring October 8,
.. lacking those rights the picture could not be shown
11'...,"'1 ....... Anet material was eliminated. In 1942 Natan trans1;~lITeiQ his Anet rights to plaintiff.
'.1943 Nebenzal, then in America, inquired by mail ef
. M. Gmess, who was plaintiff's attorney-in-faet in
concerning possible acquisition of remake rights
..... ___••u_
After extended correspondence Gmess wrote
in January, 1944, that he was authorized to sell the
language remake rights for $20,000, that the Anet
were extended to October, 1945, and that pJaintiff would
to~ do its best to secure a further extension at Nebenzal'.
In March, 1944, Gmess wrote Nebenzal that (bewar) it was impossible to cable plaintiff in Switzer.
have plaintiff contact the Anet heirs, as the territory
occupied by the enemy. Because of the uncertainty
--".,n~.... France would be liberated" and contact estabthe Anet heirs Nebenzal informed Gruess that he

)
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wished to "separate myself from" the Anet rights and would
eliminate Anet material from the intended remake of Mayerling, thereby freeing himself from the necessity of securing
an extension of the Anet rights in order to show the picture
after October, 1945, and that the new picture would be based
solely on historical material and on material original to the
script of the French Mayerling.
Thereafter by two contractsl (hereinafter termed the "main
lThe contracts, 80 far 8.11 here material, provide as follows: Mai"
ContrlJ(lt:
" ••• Whereas, the Purchaser [Nebenzlll] does not desire to nse the
features peculiar to the Claude Anet novel but base the story of the new
production on historical facta, on features original with the script of the
Motion Picture • • . and on such new features as he may deem At to
introduce ••.
" FIBST: For Value received the Owner [plaintiff] hereby sella,
assigns, quitclaims and granta to the Purchaser all the Owner's rights in
and to the Motion Picture to the extent that it owns those rights itself,
including the right to make and produce a motion picture in Engliah based
thereon, as well as the right to nse the title' MayerUng' ••• but excluding those rights expressly excepted and/or reserved herein, I'BoVIDED,
however, that the right to nse the novel by Claude Anet or the name of
the author thereof ill not being transferred. But nothing herein contained
shall be deemed to prevent the Purchaser from using any material in eaid
novel which may be in public domain and/or hilltorical in source _ ..
"THIBD: [Nebenzal agreed not to exploit the new motion picture in
ten Central European countries until three years after the ceasation of
hostilities therein.] . ..
"FIFTH: The unqualified right of the Owner to exploit the original
French version in the original French language under the title 'Mayerling' ill hereby expressly reserved •..
" ELEVENTH: It ill agreed that all questions arilling on a disagreement, including all questions relating to the construction, performance
and enforcement thereof, shall be determined in accordance with the lawa
of the State of New York •.• "
Option 4grtl6merat:
The option agreement recites execution of the main contract, and thea
provides that in consideration of One Dollar it ill agreed that:
•• FIRST: In case the Purchaser should, in the future, for any rea8OJI.
whatever, desire to acquire the rights based on the Claude Anet novel.
the Owner grants to the Purchaser the option to acquire those rights to
the extent the Owner owns them. itself and for the time the Owner owna
those rights ••• for the price of One Hundred .•• Dollan,
"PROVIDED, the Purehaaer exercises the option ••• within three (a)
months after the Armistice concluding the present war in Europe, however, at the latest by July 8, 1945.
"SECOND: In the event the Purchaser should exercise the option,
the Owner also agrees, upon expre88 request to be made by the Purchaser,
to try to the best of the Owner's abilities to obtain an extension of the
Claude Anet rights which • . . expire on October 8, 1945, for another five
(5) years, provided that the Purchaser .•• furnishes the consideration
to be paid the heirs of Claude Anet for that extension •• _
" THIBD: Under all circumstances, and without having to make any
contribution to the price to be paid to the heirs • • • for the extension
_ • • the Owner shall be entitled to the use and exploitation of the rights
dealt with hereia tor its own purposes in aeeordanee with the 1'III8l'fttiou
ma4e in the apeement Biped aimultaneonsl7 ••• "

)
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contract" and the "option agreement") dated July 25, 1944,
but not delivered or effective until September, 1944, when
the cash price of $20,000 was paid, plaintiff (acting through
Grucss) sold to Nebenzal all of plaintiff's rights to Mayerling,
includi.ng remake rights in English, but excepting the Anet
. material and excepting plaintiff's right to exploit the French
Mayerling; and also granted Nebenzal an option to purchase
prior to July 8, 1945, plaintiff's Anet rights, and agreed to
'assist Nebenzal in obtaining at his own expense an extension
the Anetrights beyond their expiration date of October 8,
o. '1945.
These are the two contracts differing interpretations
which give rise to this litigation.
. Nebenzal, who was not then seeking the Anet rights, did
request the option agreement and when it was presented
him personally by Gruess in New York on July 26 or 27,
he pointed out to Gruess that •• I was not interested, for
good reasons, that is why I had them [Anet rights]
'elimi:na1;ed from the main contract, in which he was willing
them to me, and I said I didn't want them. And he
. • .. it doesn't cost you anything, you might as well
them and if you want to take up the option you can take
up; if you don't have to, you don't have to.' . . . I said
• . I have no intention of using the Claude Anet rights in
remake of the picture.' He insisted, however, it might be
"'''''._ . .L.' so I signed it in view of the fact it was an option, it
mean anything to me. I had no intentions of picking up
... [A]s it was an option, which I felt I could
or not pick up, I accepted . . ." Nebenzal did not
n~~cule the option and did not request plaintiff to secure an
of the Anet rights. Subsequently Nebenzal conan additional sum of $7500 to obtain a release to himMayerling from the United States Office of Alien Propwhich agency was then claiming title to the picture.
September, 1944, one Marcel Hellman, of London, who
Ii friend of Nebenzal and of Natan, arrived in New York,
he learned of Nebenzal's intention to remake Mayer. Hellnian then proceeded to Hollywood, where in October,
.0 he and Nebenzal discussed Mayerling and the Anet
Nebenzal told Hellman of Nebenzal's acquisition from
of the remake rights to Mayerling and showed Hellrecitals set forth in the main agreement between
and Nebenzal stating that the Anet rights had been
to plaintiff for the period expiring October 8,

of
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1945; and Hellman stated that be had negotiated through his
lawyer in Paris for an option to himself acquire motion picture rights in the Anet material for a five or seven year term
beyond October, 1945, as he also intended to remake Mayerling ;
Hellman's proposed option had no connection with the Anet
rights formerly held by Natan, which expired in October,
1945. While Hellman was still in Los Angeles he promised
to assign to Nebenzal without profit to himself, Hellman (i.e.,
at Hellman's cost price of between $1,000 and $2,000), the
license for Anet rights beyond October, 1945, but stated that
he wanted Nebenzal to pay an additional sum of money therefor to Natan, who "was coming back from the waI:s"; after
further discussion Nebenzal agreed to pay Hellman's costs
and to give Natan $2,000. Subsequently, while in New York
en route to London, Hellman promised Nebenzal's lawyer to
make the assignment of his Anet rights to Nebenzal "without
any benefit or profit" to Hellman as soon 88 Hellman reached
London and .. received the documents."
Hellman returned to Europe, learned that the Anet heirs
bad declined to grant the option he sought but instead wished
to sell outright a license to use the Anet material for a fixed
term. He and Natan thereupon purchased in Hellman '8
name, from the Anet heirs, for between $1,500 and $3,000, a
license to use the Anet material for a period of ten years (to
October 8, 1955), and (in about March, 1945) decided to ask
Nebenzal $10,000 therefor. After some delay and objections to
the price Nebenzal paid the $10,000 to Hellman'8 attorney in
New York and on or about October 31, 1945, the assignment
(dated July 9, 1945) of the Anet rights from Hellman to
Nebenzal was consummated. Nebenzal, who had believed that
he had acquired the Anet rigqts from Hellman in the fall of
1944, had informed plaintiff's agent Gruess of the fact as he
believed it in the early spring of 1945.
In the spring of 1946 defendants "heard" that Mayerling
was being shown in France or Alsace-Lorraine, and in the fall
of that year they instituted suit in France to stop exhibition
of the picture, on the theory that inasmuch as plaintiff's Anet
license had expired and that all Anet rights to use such material in any motion picture for the 10-year period had been
independently acquired by defendants, plaintiff could no
longer exhibit or "exploit" the French language Mayerling.
In July, 1947, plaintiffs filed this suit, the purpose of which
is, as stated hereinabove, 'to enjoin defendants from interfering with exhibition of the French picture and from further
prosecuting the suit in France, and to recover damages.

')
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Plaintiff ('on tends that under the provisions of paragraph
numbered FIFTH of the main agreement and that llllmberl'd
THIRD in the option agreement it bad the right, a'i against
Nebenzal. to continue exploiting Mayerling. Plaintiff asserts
in tbis connection that the option agreement describes "the
only manner in which the defendant Nebenzal might acquire
the Anet rights," and alleges that Nebenzal "and bis agents,
_ servants, and employees ... secretly, maliciously and frand- ulently " acquired the Anet license without telling plaintiff,
and thereby rendered .. it impossible for plaintiff to secure
an extension of the Anet rigbts as provided" in the option
agreement "or at all." Plaintiff further argues, in effect, that
the option agreement which ostensibly runs in favor of Neben:. sal in reality places upon Nebenzal a greater burden or oblilla. don than upon plaintiff; i.e., plaintiff was required only. upon
: reqnest of Nebenzal, to "try to the best of" its "abilities" to
C~cure extension of the Anet rights beyond October 8, 1945,
;'whereas Nebenzal was absolutely obligated, if by his own
--.......A'''''',..;a ... and at his own expense he acquired an Anet license,
such license, or permission to operate under it, to
. ..,JU V ""-

The court, however, found contrary to plaintiff's allegations
-secrecy, malice and fraud, and further found that neither
nor any person acting for him c, did anything to
1,NnaE!r it impossible for plaintiff to secure an extension of
bet rights," and that "the plaintiff since October 8,1945,
- no right to distribute or exploit or exhibit . . . Mayerling
ra"IV1IIrhp'l'P in thE' world." In an oral decision delivered at the
~elnsion of the trial, the trial judge declared his view of
evidence and of the contracts between the parties. as
1'fil.1lnWR: By the main contract plaintiff "reserved to itself the
to exploit the original French version of Mayerling, and
-, it does not say so, it mnst be construed to be to the
-that the plaintift' owned or continued to own those
it is conceded by all concerned that the right to
or exploit. as is the term used throughout here, a
picture, ends in any country with the termination of
pnlUl'll pT'll A I rights between the author and the producer
this case, was October 8, 1945 .. . Now . . . all
option agreement] amounted to was giving him
an option to thE'ir [plaintiff's] Anet rights to
8, 1945, if he desired to purchase them, and they agreed

- ...... un
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to use their best efforts to get an extension for him withol t
additional cost t>xcepting the cost they were put to followin;.:
that date. They didn't bind themselves to do anything in
particular in that rt·gard excepting to use their best offict>s.
"Now the efft>ct of all this, it seems to the Court, is that
Quader-Kino expected, during this difficult war period, that
at the conclusion of hostilities they would be able to readily
get an extension of these Anet rights from the heirs of Claude
Anet. They did not contemplate, apparently, that anyone
else might negotiate for them, or, if they did, that they were
not bound in any event under this option agreement to deliver
anything additional in such a contingency. Had they desired
to bind Nebenzal in the particular in which they have sought
to construe these documents, they should have included in their
contract some provision to the effect that he would look entirely
to them and to no one else for any Anet rights extension, and
that he waived any right he might have to such rights subsequent to October 8, 1945, excepting through them . . . [T]he
Court finds that there has been no fraud established in this
case on the part of the defendants . . . And . . . finds that
under the . . . option agreement . . . there is no requirement
reserved whereby the defendant had to . . . refrain from preventing the plaintiff from securing the extension of the Anet
rights, or that inhibited the defendant from taking the steps
which he did in this case."
[1] It is apparent that the evidence hereinabove summarized supports the court's decision and the written findings
based thereon. As declared in Edwards v. Billow (1948), ::ll
Cal.2d 350, 359 [188 P.2d 748] (see also cases cited therein),
"Under such circumstances this court will adhere to the illterpretation placed by tJie trial court on the writings and the
eonduct of the parties."
Plaintiff urges, however, that under New York law, whiC"'h
was to control construction of the main agreement (see parflgraph number ELEVENTH), that agreement either imposed on
Nebenzal an "express duty to permit plaintiff to continue tIle
exhibition of 'Mayerling' beyond October 8, 1945," or else
bound Nebenzal by an "implied covenant" not to interfere
with plaintiff's acquisition of an extension of ABet rights and
not to use his own independently acquired ABet license to
prevent plaintiff from exploiting Mayerling. On this point
lliaintiff relies first on a statement in Kirke La SheUe Co. v.
Paul Armstrong Co. (1933), 263 N.Y. 79,87 [188 N.E. 163],
\hat "In the last anlyaia those cases only appQr the principle

)
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that in every contract there is an implied covenant that
neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of
destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive
the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract
there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing," and upon statements from other cases to the effect that
good faith and honest dealing are required between contracting
• parties. [2] Here, however, plaintiff as the party who was
; selling the Mayerlingremake rights received "the fruits of the
contract" in the form of the $20,000 paid it by Nebenzal; 80
far as Nebenzal's contractual obligations to plaintiff are cont- cerned Nebenzal had by such payment performed his part of
! the contract and nothing further remained to be done. More.
over, as found by the trial court, there is no evidence of any
\ but fair and honest dealing on his part. Certainly he had no
obligation under the main contract-or under the option agreement either, for that matter-to sit idly by and do nothing
\', when he was told in the fall of 1944 that Hellman had acquired
? the license or "extension" of Anet rights beyond October 8,
1945. He was as free as any other would-be purchaser of
those rights to negotiate with Hellman to secure them. Moreover, as found by the trial court and as shown by the evidence,
. he informed plaintiff's agent Gruess as early as the spring of
1945 that he was acquiring the so-called "extension" or new
1icense which Hellman had secured.
,
'Underhill v. Schenck (1924),238 N.Y. 7 [143 N.E. 773, 33
ifi:~~.LI"'Lto. 303], also relied upon by plaintiff, involves facts and
differing materially' from those in this case, and
li;4\lbill!equelntly is not persuasive to plaintiff's view. Suffice it
say that that action was between a licensor and a licensee,
. were to share jointly in the profits of a stage production,
did not involve an outright cash sale such as that from
ffaintiff to Nebenzal.
Plaintiff further urges that attempts admittedly made
:Nebenzal, subsequent to the exccution of the two contracts
involved, to purchase from plaintiff all of its rights in
. French Mayerling, amounted to a practical construction
contracts by the parties and a concession by Nebenzal
.plaintiff still continued to possess the right to exploit
even after plaintiff's Anet rights expired in OctoHowever, Nebenzal testified that his efforts in this
which failed because of lack. of agreement on the
be paid, were for the purpose of acquiring the French
. and prints and of removinc "from circulation en-

t
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tirely the old Mayerling . . . In my negotiations with Mary
Pickford, . . . my negotiations before that and after that
with Selznick and others, I found that it was most desirable to
have the old negative and old prints, and that is, in fact,
customary in the industry, that when a remake of an old
picture is contemplated, that the major studios do not like to
see prints or negatives of the former picture around if it can
be avoided. This is customary to such an extent that in every
sales contract when you grant a license to a buyer for a limited
period of time there is always included a paragraph whereby
the license holder is obliged to return to you the prints which
he is holding, at the expiration of the license period. Also
negatives if he should have any, original or dupe negatives."
Any conflict in the evidence on this point was resolved in
defendant's favor by the trial court, whose determination in
this respect is conclusive on appeal.
.
[3] PlaintiiI attacks a finding by the trial court that defendant Nero Films, Inc., is not the alter ego of defendant
Nebenzal. However, plaintiff concedes in its brief that the
court so found "Since the doctrine of alter ego arises only to
prevent fraud or injustice, and the trial court felt there was
neither." Inasmuch as the court's finding that plaintiff had
failed to establish fraud or injustice is supported by the evidence, it is obvious that plaintiff is not prejudiced by the finding of which it complains.
[4] Plaintiff next urges that a finding that Nebenzal assigned to defendant Nero Films, Inc., the Mayerling remake
and the Anet rights, and that Nero Films, Inc. reassigned to
Nebenzal, is not supported by the evidence. In view of the
finding against fraud and injustice on Nebenzal's part it is
apparent that this finding likewise is not prejudicial to plaintiff. However, the record reveals both oral and documentary
evidence unnecessary to relate here which support it. There
is an obvious clerical error in another finding (No. XI), in
which the phrase "which the defendant had advised the defendant" was meant to read "which Hellman had advised the
defendant, I t but it furnishes no ground for reversal.
[5] Finally, plaintiff contends that the court erred in inclnding in the judgment a statement "That ever since Octob('r 8, 1945, the plaintiff, Quader-Kino A.G., a corporation,
did not have and doe~ not now have any right to distribute,
exploit or exhibit the motion picture Mayerling anywhere in
the world." Plaintiff in its complaint alleged that it is
"owner of the world-wide" rights to Mayerling, and defend-

)
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ants denied the allegation. In order to completely determine
the rights of the parties the court by its judgment correctly
defined those rights according to the findings. (See Q'Melia
v. Adkins (1946), 73 Cal.App.2d 143, 148 [166 P.2d 298).)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-I cannot agree that the eontracts between Quader-Kin() and NebenzaJ do not give QuaderKino the right to enjoin Nebenzal's interference with the exploitation of their motion picture.
Defendant Nebenzal acquired by purchase the right to produce a remake of plaintiff's "Mayerling" in English. To get
that right Nebeozal had to pay $20,000 and to agree not only
that plaintiff retained "the unqua1i1ied right" to exploit its
original French version of "Mayerling" without restriction
as to time, but also that Nebenzal's remake would not compete
with the French version in certain countries until three years
after the cessation of hostilities. These conditions in plain
language assured plaintiff the right to continue the exploitation of "Mayerling" without interference from Nebenzal.
It Nebenzal now attempts to prevent that exploitation not~Withstanding that his promise not to interfere therewith was
part of the consideration for the sale of the remake rights.
,Defendant seeks to justify bis action on the ground that he
liow owns the Anet rights on which 5'per cent of "Mayerling" is based and that, since the Anet heirs or any third perIliOn acquiring the rights could prevent the exhibition of the
;picture 80 long as it incorporates the Anet material, Nebenzal .
~1 also prevent its exhibition. So far as Nebenzal is eonperned, howeve~, his ownership of the Anet rights is immaThe ..........tion of the "unqualliled right" to which
" ,ebenzal agreed does not admit of the qualification "if Quaderi ' 0 acquires an extension qf the Anet rights before Nebeozal
~t.s them to it." As between Nebenzal and Quader-Kino,
~e latter's reserved right was "unqua1i1ied," as the contract

)

r-'

)tatecL
the granting of the remake rights to Nebenzal the
!JOlt serious threat to plaintiff's exploitation of its picture

It Upon

F
5rU',",-',., .

t of competition or interference from Nebenzal. It

tha,

,~etefore demanded and received from Nebenzal contractual
~,
'cea that he would not interfere with the exhibitioll ef

~/L,.~
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"Mayerling" at any time and would not compete with it in
certain countries. It was entitled to rely on those assurances.
Another risk confronting plainti1i was the possibility of its
not securing an~xtension of the Anet rights. War conditions
made it impossible to secure that extension at the time the
contracts were ~xecuted, but Quader-Kino was justifiably convinced that it could secure the extension when communication
with occupied Europe was reestablished. The rights were
excluded from the grant of the remake rights but ",ere covered by a simultaneously executed supplemental agreement.
Nebenzal was given the option to acquire "those rights to the
extent the Owner [Quader-Kino] owns them itself" and it
was agreed that if he exercised the option Quader-Kino would
use its best efforts to secure their extension. The supplemental
agreement makes it plain that if Nebenzal purchased the Anet
rights "to the extent the owner owns them himself" or if
plaintiff acquired an extension of the rights for Nebenzal,
they were to be held for their mutual benefit. "Under all
circumstances, and without having to make any contribution
to the price to be paid to the heirs of Claude Anet for the
extension of the rights, ( Quader-Kino] shall be entitled to
the use and exploitation of the rights dealt with herein for
its own purposes in accordance with the reservations made in
the agreement signed simultaneously .. and those reservations
are hereby expressly made part of this agreement." -It is
true that Nebenzal did not agree not to purchase the rights
independently. He knew. however, that the Anet rights would
soon expire and that plainti1i's reservation of the unqualified
right to exploit the picture and the limitation on the exhibition of the English remake would be valueless to plaintiff un-, --less an extension -of the Anet rights was obtained.
The n~otiations for the Sale of the remake rights were
begun when Hitler's European fortress had been dented only
at Salerno and the cessation of hostilities seemed remote.
When the contracts were executed the Allied armies were still
contained in the Cherbourg Peninsula and had not penetrated
farther east thim St. Lo. It would have been absurd at that
time to contract so carefully about rights that would expire _
shortly and would have no value before their expiration.
The Anet rights at that time had only 14 months to rnn.
The exhibition of "Mayerling" in continental Europe before
October 8, 1945, was virtually impossible. It is hardly conceivable that plaintiff would have insisted on reserving rights
that would be virtually useless to it. The contr~ have
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· meaning only if they are construed as providing for the
· acquisition of the Anet rights for the mutual benefit of Quader,
" Kino and Nebenzal.
\
The supplemental agreement was based on the understanding that Quader-Kino would eventually secure an extension
of the Anet rights. Nebenzal was given the opportunity to
share in those rights by paying the costs that Quader-I{ino
would incur in their acquisition. Nebenzal in turn agreed
that "Under all circumstances, and without having to make
any contribution to the price to be paid to the heirs of Claude
Anet for the extension of the rights," Quader-Kino would be
entitled to their concurrent use. These mutual obligations
are clear even without express words of promise. (Atwater If
Co. v. Panama R. R. Co., 246 N.Y. 519, 524 [159 N.E. 418).)
. Although it is true that Nebenzal did not expressly agree not
to purchase the rights independently and use them to prevent
plaintiff's exploitation of its picture, "we think ..' . that
• luch a promise is fairly to be implied. The law has outgrown
its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was
· the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a
broader view today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the
whole writing may be 'instinct with an obligation' imperfectly
·
" (Cardozo, J., in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gor222 N.Y. 88, 91 [118 N.E. 214] ; Moran v. Standard Oil
.of New York, 211 N.Y. 187, 197-198 [105 N.E. 217];
'.
v. North American Light ct Power Co., 106 F.2d 74,
; Coghlan v. Stetson, 19 F. 727, 730; De Cesare v. Occh.. ··-·----····
"64 N.Y.S.2d 675,677; McCaU Co. v. Wright, 133 App.Div.
~_.,·"o [117 N.Y.S. 775].) The contracts carry the inescapable
EtnllUCliticm that the parties contemplated that the extension
Anet rights would be secured for their mutual beneflt.
ork law, in such cases, implies in the contract a "covegood faith and fair dealing," that neither party shall
action that may destroy or impair the right of the
. party to r"eeive the anticipated fruits of the contract.
La Shelle Co. v Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87
N.E. 163]; Underhill v. Schenck, 238 N.Y. 7, 15 [143
. '.773,33 A.L.R. 303] ; Price v. Spielman Motor Sales Co.,
. 626 [26 N.Y.S.2d 836. 839] ; Genet v. Delaw4f'6
.
.....n ...n ... Canal Co., 136 N.Y. 593. 608, 611-612 {32 N.E.
L.R.A. 1271; Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasti1lg
.2d 373. 377; Frohman v. Pitch, 164 App.Div. 231
633, 634j ; Goldberg, 168-05 Corp. v. LefJY, 170
[9 N.Y.S.2d 304, 306] ; Guardino Tank Proc. Corp•
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v. Ouson, 89 N.Y.S.2d 691, 696-697; Bennett tI. Vansyckel,
4 Duer (N.Y.) 462, 472.) Nebenzal breached that implied
covenant when he purchased and used only for his own purposes rights in which both parties were given a concurrent
interest.
The majority opinion states that "plaintiff • . . received
'the fruits of the contract' in the fonn of the $20,000 paid
it by Nebenzal; so far as Nebenzal's contractual obligations
to plaintiff are concerned Nebenzal had by ,such payment perfonned his part of the contract and nothin~ further remained
to be done." That statement overlooks the fact that the reservation of Quader-Kino's "unqualiflen rig-ht" to continue the
exploitation· of its picture wa." part of the consideration in
Addition to the $20,000 paid for the grant of the remake rights.
Moreover, the New York coun." include as "fruits of the con·
tract" any benefit that either party expects to derive from
the subject of the contract when' that' expectation appeal'A
from its tenns. Rights reserved under a contract of license
or sale are as much the fruits of that contract &oil rights ini·
tially created thereunder. (Manners v. Uoro.,co, 252 U.S.
317,327 [40 S.Ct. 335, 64 L.Ed. 5901; Harper Bros. v. Klaw,
232 F. 609, 613; Uproar Co. v. NationaZ Broadcasting Co.,
81 F.2d 373. 377.) Thus, plaintiff reserved as fruits of its
contract with Nebenzal the unqualified right to continue the
exploitation of "Mayerling" and the right to use the Anet
rights for that purpose. Nebenzal impliedly covenanted not
to do anything to impair the value of those rights. He breached
the covenant, not when he purchased the Anet rights but
when he used those rights to relltrnin plaintiff's exhibition of
ita motion picture.
The facts of ihis case are analogous to those of Benne#.!~...
Vamyckel, supra, 4 Duel' (N.Y.) 462. Defendant therein assigned a lease for a tenn of years to the plaintiff. At its
expiration, defendant obtained a new lease from the lesSor to
the exclusion of his assignee. The court decreed that defendant held the new lease as a con!!trllctive trustee for the benefit of the plaintiff, on the ground that defendant breached
his implied covenant of fair dealing by acting adversely to
plaintUf's expectation that he would obtain a renewal of the
lease for his own benefit. By the same reasoning, Nebenzal
clearly breached his implied covenant not to secure and use
adversely to plaintiff, rights that both parties contemplated
plaintiil would attempt to secure for their mutual benefit.
The failure of the majority opinion to adhere to the role of
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the New York cases is not justified by its statement that·" as
found by the trial court, there is no evidence of any but fair
and honest dealing on [Nebenzal's] part." If in fact a contract has been breached, the good faith of the defendant nr his
belief in the legal rectitude of his action is immaterial. The
requirement of fair dealing, as the New York court has specifically held, is not dependent upon the presence or· absence
of intentional bad faith. The gravamen of a plaintUf's cause
.of action is the fact that its contractual expectations have
'been destroyed, and not the intention with which defendant
:'has destroyed them. (Be'lt'ltett v. VamyckeZ,4 Duer (N.Y.)
1462,472; Kirke La 8heUe Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y.
"79,89 [188 N.E. 163] ; Harper Bros. v. KZaw, 232 F. 609, 613;
: Ward v. Whit'ltey, 8 N.Y. 442, 446.) The converse result
;'~reached by the majority opinion can be supported only it the
liapplicable New York law is disregarded; that cannot be done
view of the express provision that New York law should
~!_,v,.'m ,. all questions relating to the construction, enforceand performance" of the contracts. (Boole v. U'ltUm
IJllal,",7&8 1m. Co., 52 Cal.App. 207, 209 [198 P. 416] ; M~tuaZ
1m. Co. v. Cohen, 179 U.S. 262, 267 [21 S.Ct. 106,45 L.Ed.
] ; Duskin v. Pe'ltmylva'ltia-Central Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d
730; Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 216 App.Div. 362 [215 NY.S.
189].)
majority opinion seeks to justify its interpretation of
contract on the ground that I I 'this court will adhere to the
Ihtetrp]~eUiLtion placed by the trial court on the writings and
•~nduet of the parties.'" The interpretation of a conor other written instrument, however, if there is no
~1JlS1C evidence thereon or if the evidence. is without conand not susceptible of con1licting inferences, is a qurstion
and the finding of the trial court thereon is not conon appeal. {Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131
825] ; J01I,e. v. PoUock, 34 Cal.2d 863 [215 P.2d 733] ;
.
Coal ct Mi'lting Co. v. Jones, 27 Cal.2d 819, 826-827
P.2d 719,164 A.L.R. 685]; Union Oil Co. v. Union Sugar
. . Cal.2d 300,306 [188 P.2d 470] ; Trubowiteh v. Biv.rUa1~nt11la Co., 30 Cal.2d 335, 339 [182 P.2d 182]; Bra'll'
'(l!IJrli.,,_4ln Dairie., Inc., 4 Cal.2d 128, 133 [48 P.2d 13];
. 01 Norris, 78 Cal.App.2d 152, 159 [177 P.2d 299];
.01 O'Brien, 74 Cal.App.2d 405, 407 [168 P.2d 432] ;
" Saving. Bank v. Costa, 83 Cal.App.2d 368, 372
.. 778].) The only evidence the majority opinion
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invokes to support the trial court's erroneous interpretation
is the testimony of Nebenzal that he did not want the Anl"t
rights and that he signed the supplemental agreement under
the impression that "it was an option, which I felt I could
pick up or not pick up." Conceding that the trial court could
believe Nebenzal's statement that he did not want the Anet
rights in view of his payment of more than $10,000 for them
six months later, I find nothing in his testimony to indicate
that the parties gave the third clause of the agreement any
construction other than its patent implication. The agreement was in part an option, as Nebenzal stated; nonetheless
by signing it he bound himself to its provisions, including their
express recognition of Quader-Kino's intention to continue
exhibiting the old picture under an extension of the ABet
rights and the protection of its interest in those rights. Nothing in the testimony casts doubt on the clear agreement in the
main contract on Quader-Kino's reservation of rights. Finally,
even if Nebenzal's testimony disclosed a secret intention not
to be bouild by that agreement, that intention is irrelevant.
"It is now a settled principle of the law of contract that the
undisclosed intentions of the parties are . . . immaterial;
and that the outward manifestation or expression of assent
is controlling." (Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal.2d
128, 133 [48 P.2d 13] ; 1 Rest., Contracts, § 20.) .
I would therefore reverse the judgment and remand the
cause with directions to the trial court to grant the injunction
as prayed and to determine the amount, if any, of damage
suiIered by Quader-Kino as a result of Nebenzal'8 breach of
their contract.
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